





Who Are We, Filipinos? A Note1 




To know who we are, Filipinos, we must know who we 
were, Indios. On the one hand, we have few precolonial 
documents which might tell who the Indio was; on the 
other hand, the Filipino is the Westernized Indio. The 
Filipino is who the West says the Filipino is. According to 
Western research, the Filipino, like all Orientals, is a 
residual category of the Occidental: not Western. There is 
need of independent Asian research. The only really 
ancient documents connecting the Filipino with the Indio 
are perhaps our music and dance, and, above all, our 
languages, surely, our national language. The irony of it, it 
is precisely these that the Filipino government has removed  
from the curriculum of higher education. They are said to 
distract the youth from change, burdening them instead 
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Philippine education from the Introduction to a forthcoming book: The Human 
Organization. Science, not Scientism. Technology, not Technocracy. Language, not 
Linguistics. 
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with the heavy baggage of the past. But what is change? Is it  
continuity or discontinuity? Ang hindi marunong lumingon  
sa pinanggalingan ay hindi makararating sa paroroonan. 
The High School graduate is helpless against bully 
scholarship. Higher education is the proper center for 
Asian research, one that will not assume that the West has 
the exclusive franchise on reason and efficiency; one that 
can meet theory with theory. We cannot overemphasize 
that if East and West are not dichotomous, still they are 
different. In order for our leaders to be able to successfully 
manage the difference, Asian research must reveal why and 
how they are different, why and how they must combine, if 
only so that our institutions may become more effective 
and more just. If we want to modernize quickly, copy 
superior technology but keep the faith in our traditions, in 
ourselves: sa ating pinanggalingan.  
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ho are we, Filipinos?” is a question about our 
identity as a people. It is not about the citizen, 
for the Filipino citizen is quickly identified. When Andres 
Bonifacio and his compatriots tore their cedulas, I don’t think 
they wanted to symbolize they were not Filipinos. Or did 
they? We have been cautioned not to dilute being Filipino 
with foreign ideas and ideals of colonizers. The irony is that 
 “W




the Filipino is the Westernized Indio. To know who we are, 
mustn’t we know who the Indio was before he was 
Filipinized? A word of wisdom from our original millennials: 
Ang hindi marunong lumingon sa pinanggalingan ay hindi 
makararating sa paroroonan. 
For global and official communicative interaction, we 
now speak and write in English. We have no quarrel with 
that. But must we, too, do a Brexit? I thought the Angles, 
the Saxons, and the Normans came from continental 
Europe? Does the individual have to deny his individuality 
to be a member of a family? When the New Testament 
Christian is asked to leave father and mother for the Christ, 
does it mean dumping the Old like a cocoon in a 
metamorphosis? But the Christian keeps citing chapter and 
verse from the Old Testament to define who he or she is. 
Indeed, his name is Adam; her name is Eve. Are not the 
New Testament parables a dialectic of sic et non, not either-
or? of continuity rather than discontinuity?  
Admittedly, the search for origins raises a problem that is 
peculiar to the Philippines among the nation-states in 
Southeast Asia. Our pre-Hispanic ninuno (ancestors) did not 
leave us records of their thoughts and deeds—at best, a few 
scattered documents and inscriptions, but no body of myths 
or monuments that might tell us of their achievements prior 
to the coming of the Spaniard. Apparently, the oldest known 
document of pre-Hispanic times in the Philippines is the 
Laguna Copperplate Inscription, dated around 900 AD and 




discovered in 1986. It may be that more clues will be 
discovered in the future. But in the meantime, how are we to 
learn about what our ancient forbearers thought and did, 
about what and who they were, prior to being taught or told 
what to think about themselves? How do we write their 
history not as prehistory but as history, our history? 
Of course, the Filipino today is not the precolonial Indio. 
Between the old and the new, change has occurred. But 
what is change? Is it moving from one place to another? Is it 
leaving the past behind, a Gone with the Wind event, as in 
Mitchell’s novel by that title? Or is it continuity, like Aeneas 
carrying Anchises on his back out of burning Troy? Or like 
Takezo who became Musashi, a legendary swordsman, as 
told in the Japanese episodic novel by that name of Eiji 
Yoshikawa?2 These three images suggest divergent attitudes 
to social change, succinctly summed up in the textbook 
division of the world into the traditional East and the 
modern West, the latter decoupled from the past, the former 
inseparably one with it. “East is East and West is West and 
never the twain shall meet,” said Kipling, who offered a way 
out of the impasse other than the battlefield, where Eastern 
and Western lose all significance in the face of death the 
leveler. Dead, everything is the same. Kipling suggested 
leaving the old behind to be apprenticed in the new. Aeneas  
 
 
2  Eiji Yoshikawa, Musashi. Translated from the Japanese by Charles S. 
Terry, Foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer (New York: Kodansha USA, 2012). 




refused to leave Anchises behind. But in Yoshikawa’s novel, 
Takezo became Musashi. The Occidental was thinking 
physics; the Oriental was thinking metaphysics. 
There are real grounds for the Oriental/Occidental 
division, one of them being the vagaries of history. The two 
hemispheres have contrasting histories. The modern West 
jettisoned the traditional like a ladder that had served its 
purpose. Europe even has a bloody, but triumphant, symbol 
of the exact moment of rupture: the French Revolution. It 
has a second, which is a more technical symbol of the 
triumph of modern science over religious dogmatism: the 
Industrial Revolution. No such metamorphosis occurred in 
the Orient, for it remained attached to its old traditions, 
even when it turned modern, as in Japan. The Jewish people 
were scattered in the Diaspora, but remained a nation after 
they ceased to be a nation-state. The Samurai institution may 
have disappeared in Japan, but not the Samurai ethic.  
In Japanese feudal society, the daimyo, the lords ruling 
from the top, were followed by the samurai, who were then 
followed by the commoners, farmers, artisans, and traders, 
in the order of traditional social hierarchy. The samurai were 
a class apart, in the ‘middle’ class, but totally dependent on 
the lord. From him they received their existence and it was 
him they served with total loyalty. The samurai were the 
extended sword of the daimyo they served, so that when the 
world of the daimyo collapsed, the world of the samurai 
collapsed with it. Samurai of defeated lords were hunted 




down by samurai of victorious lords. They were the ronin: 
samurai on the run, in search of new lords to serve. To 
survive, the roving samurai had to be a superior warrior, and 
superiority consisted in a superior weapon or a superior 
technique, or both.  
The samurai stood between lord and commoner, and 
typically identified himself with the lord. The old way was 
total loyalty to the lord and total dependence on warrior 
skills. But now Takezo had gained new purpose in fighting 
for the common peasant, with whom, in the end, he was 
one. Purpose is not technique but direction. Takezo turned 
from serving the lord to serving the peasant, linking his 
fortune with the most vulnerable among the people. Takezo 
saw that he could provide what they needed: a technique of 
survival. There was need for the transfer of technology. 
There is a thesis that the history of the Filipino really 
began with the discovery of the Islands by Ferdinand 
Magellan, the Portuguese sea captain with the Spanish 
mandate to reach the East by travelling west. We need not 
go into the details of the argument, for we do not doubt that 
the history of the Filipino began with the colonization by 
Spain, if, by definition, the Filipino is the westernized Indio 
of Las Islas Filipinas, named after Felipe Segundo of Spain. A 
Spanish friend once told me that in Catholic Spain, one did 
not celebrate birthdays, for even pigs have birthdays. 
Celebrated was the day one was christened, when one 
received a name, typically of the Saint of the Day in the 




Catholic calendar. On this account of it, the history of the 
Filipino began at the historical moment when his 
westernization began: the discovery of the islands by 
Magellan in 1521 or their colonization by Miguel López de 
Legazpi in 1565. The logic is impeccable but only if we 
accept the premise. For the passage from Indio to Filipino 
was not a Gone with the Wind change, but a Musashi change, in 
which the Filipino remains one with the Indio, is the Indio. 
Such a transformation is not conceived ontically (physics), 
but ontologically (metaphysics), for ideas and ideals are 
constitutive of the latter but not of the former. 
The concept of Musashi change, however, is problematic 
in our case. We have no Borobudur or Angkor Wat, nor 
records of kingdoms or empires such as the Srivijaya and 
Majapahit of Indonesia. The only truly ancient documents 
that we have are like footprints—bakas ng kahapon—our 
music and dance, and above all, our languages, surely our 
national language. But these, ironically, have been recently 
excluded by the Filipino government from the curriculum of 
higher education. The aim of the education of the Filipino, it 
is said, is progress through innovative change. The Filipino 
identity it presupposes is the Filipino of modern times, 









Precolonial Southeast Asia 
Fr. Horacio de la Costa’s Asia and the Philippines,3 a small 
collection of essays, offers an indirect and general 
reconstruction of our precolonial past. The general picture it 
gives of Southeast Asia on “the eve of the Western impact” is 
one of Indianized, Sinicized, and Islamized kingdoms and 
empires. The social and political institutions of India, China, 
and Islam shaped the Southeast Asian states according to 
their image. But it was the Malays themselves, “with their 
amazing capacity for assimilation,” who adopted the alien 
institutions as a superstructure on a “village society, without 
inducing any essential change in it.” 
Indian and Chinese influence had imposed a 
superstructure of monarchical government, 
whereby the ruler, regarded as sacred because of 
some special relationship with the divine, 
governed through the mediation, in the 
Indianized states, of a blood aristocracy; in the 
Sinicized states, of a scholar-official class.4  
The picture is of a region influenced by India, China, and 
Islam—except the Philippines. “The fact is . . . the social and 
political evolution of the Filipinos took place under the 
 
3  Horacio de la Costa, S.J., Asia and the Philippines (Manila: Solidaridad 
Publishing House, 1967). 
4 Ibid., 7. 




influence neither of China nor of India but of a new religion: 
Islam.”  
We used to read that the Philippines, or a part of it, was 
once under the rule of the Srivijaya, but this has apparently 
been discounted by some historians, principally because of 
the sparsity of evidence of Hindu or Buddhist influence in the 
Islands, even in the Visayas.5 But the precolonial presence 
and influence of Islam in the Philippines has never been in 
doubt. In the course of the fourteenth century, perhaps 
earlier in the thirteenth, De la Costa wrote that Islam was 
brought to Mindanao by a cadet of the ruling house of 
Johore, and to Luzon by Bornean chieftains who took over 
the government of Manila, its principal port. At any rate, it 
was these Muslim communities of merchant seamen that the 
Spaniards found to be the most advanced, culturally and 
politically, when they first set foot in the Philippines.6   
Further advance of Islam in the Islands was dramatically 
halted by Legazpi’s Cruzada, conquest by the cross and the 
sword in 1565. Had Legazpi arrived some fifty years later, 
some historians now believe, Northern Philippines might 
 
5 Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines 
(Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 34. Except for the name, Abinales 
and Amoroso say, the Visayas ( Luzon and Mindanao) show little Srivijaya 
(Buddhist or Hindu) cultural influence. Luis H. Francia, A History of the 
Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (New York: The Overlook Press, 2010) 
believed that the influence of the Srivijaya empire extended to parts of the 
Philippine archipelago “with Srivijaya colonists . . . implanting the distinctive 
name of “Visayas” on its central cluster of islands.” (38) 
6 De la Costa, Asia and the Philippines, 7 




have turned Muslim, making the colonization of Luzon 
perhaps as difficult for Spain as Muslim Mindanao. 7 
Ironically, wrote Eric Casiño, Filipinos seem to have 
forgotten that “the first symbol of power and authority in 
Manila . . . was not Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the Christian 
Spaniard, but Sulayman, the Islamized Filipino [Indio?], 
proud offspring of Borneo and Luzon nobility.”8 But as fate 
would have it, only parts of Mindanao and the Visayas and of 
southern Luzon were Islamized by 1565. The Muslims 
leapfrogged as they moved northwards, which might indicate 
that they were mainly traders, like those of India and China, 
interested in creating trading posts more than crafting states.  
For our purposes, the relevant proposition of de la Costa’s 
precolonial Southeast Asia is this: the village society was the 
base society—the communidad de base of Liberation 
Theology—on which the civilizations of China, India, and 
Islam were superimposed. We take that to mean that the 
village society remained intact, but not untouched by the 
superstructure. What is a village society? De la Costa’s 
definition does not deviate from the traditional one. It is “a 
community bound together by kinship or alliances assimilated 
 
7 Francia, A History of the Philippines, 91. 
8 Eric Casiño, “Sulayman’s Manila,” in Cynthia N. Lumbera and Teresita G. 
Maceda, eds., Rediscovery (Quezon City: National Bookstore, 1981), 21. “Filipinos 
have to be reminded that the religion of the Prophet found a home not only in 
the South but also in the North, not only in Cotabato and Jolo, but also in 
Manila, the nation’s capital.” 




to kinship.” 9  It matches the description of the traditional  
society by Max Weber and Ferdinand Tönnies’ division of 
society into Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). 
The former is familial, ruled and held together by the bonds 
of kinship; the latter is official, a rational system of offices or 
bureaus.  
De la Costa further characterized the village society as “a 
society of status (rather than enterprise), based on an 
economy of subsistence (rather than exchange), governed by 
heads of families (rather than leaders or officials) according to 
customary (rather than written) law.”10 These added features, 
however, are already the result of comparing the traditional 
community with the modern society. By this comparison, the 
Muslim maritime community appeared an exception, for it 
was made of traders and had written laws. But we know from 
elsewhere that Islam, from its beginnings, always understood 
itself as a brotherhood, a term of kinship. If by status is 
meant social position, then, it does not say more or less than 
the respect for hierarchy, characteristic of the respect of 
elders in kinship systems. There are societies that are based 
on an exchange economy, governed by an officialdom and 
larger than a village. However, they remain a village society 
writ large, inasmuch and insofar as they remain fundamentally 
a Gemeinschaft in the sense of Tönnies, and feudal in the sense 
of Voltaire, who said that feudalism was a form of life and 
 
9 de la Costa, S.J., Asia and the Philippines, 7. 
10 Ibid. 




not merely a unique event, as Montesquieu said. Because the 
social structure can be informed by contrary cultures, we 
must distinguish, but not dichotomize, the bureaucratic and 
the kinship societies.  
The lack of documentary evidence made inevitable the 
indirect approach to pre-colonial Philippines. There was 
besides nothing controversial about the picture it generated. 
“Precolonial Southeast Asia,” the first chapter of Fr. de la 
Costa’s book, was originally a lecture given at a seminar for 
American teachers, and reflected on the common assessment 
of the Orient by Western scholarship.  
The apothegm of the Byzantine jurists of the 
Emperor Justinian, “Quod placuit principi, legis habet 
vigorem [The pleasure of the prince has the force of 
law], would have been perfectly acceptable to the 
kings of Angkor and Pagan; but the principle of 
the Magna Carta that no freeman could be 
arrested, imprisoned, deprived of his property, 
outlawed, exiled, or “in any way destroyed” 
except by “legal judgment of his peers or by the 
law of the land” would have been 
incomprehensible not only to the kings, but, more 
significantly, to their subjects.11 
 
 
11 de la Costa, S.J., Asia and the Philippines, 8. 




Precolonial Southeast Asian society was the village society 
informed by one or two or all three Oriental civilizations of  
India, China, and Islam. The religion of India sought some 
ultimate reality behind appearances, which was attainable by 
those who could transcend the human condition through the 
power of magic, or the practice of asceticism. Essentially 
aristocratic, the Indian way was for a few and peaked in the 
sacred ruler, who was exempt from the laws that governed 
ordinary mortals. Confucianism introduced a humanist 
element into the Southeast Asian worldview, and in Islam, an 
egalitarian one.  
The result of the ecological approach, if we may call the 
indirect approach of de la Costa, was already provided on a 
silver platter by what Edward Said called Orientalism. It 
invariably produced the same monotonous conclusion that 
the Oriental mind is traditional, and opposed to the modern 
Occidental mind, and that the Oriental society is the kinship 
society, and opposed to the rational Occidental society. 
Oriental society is the tribe, the clan, the family, the 
community—the Gemeinschaft—united by affective relations, 
subjective rather than objective, the opposite of the modern 
urban (bourgeois) society—the Gesellschaft—governed by 
reason and the ideals of individual liberty. On these terms, 
Chinese, Indian, and Islamic, civilizations were a village 
society writ large, “bound together by kinship or alliances 
assimilated to kinship.” That was how Weber, probably the 
single most influential author in social science, described 




Oriental societies as a whole: as the opposite of the rational 
society, to which he gave the name bureaucracy.  
But the Western perspective is also not without problems. 
On the one hand, impersonality is claimed to be an essential 
feature of Occidental rationality; on the other hand, personal 
liberty is a major principle of Western society, which has 
obvious reference to the individual person. Also, Western 
scholarship tends to assume that the traditional community is 
a timeless and unhistorical phenomenon (form), not because 
the Orient lay outside time and space but because it remained 
the same despite the passage of time. In contrast, change is of 
the essence of the modern industrial society. A Preindustrial 
Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age, the subtitle of The Crisis 
of Modern Islam by Bassam Tibi 12  defines what Orientalist 
literature means by a ‘timeless and unchanging Orient’.  
The Changing Orient 
A timeless and unchanging Orient is largely discredited today 
as an abstraction, and historians are revisiting the data to rectify 
the name. David Chandler rejected its application to Cambodia 
by earlier French historians, for it had clearly undergone 
tumultuous changes from internal and external forces as recently 
as the nineteenth and twentieth century. Chandler intended to 
undermine “the notion of changelessness . . . , for each of the 
 
12  Bassam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the 
Scientific-Technological Age, trans. Judith von Sivers, Foreword by Peter von 
Sivers (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988). 




chapters that follow records a major transformation in 
Cambodian life.”13 Barbara and Thomas Metcalf, rewriting the 
history of modern India, replaced the timeless and unchanging 
concept with that of discontinuity. There is a need in the 
writing of ‘national’ histories, “to show that commonsense 
notions of continuity, fostered by nationalism, must be 
replaced by an understanding of the newness of modern 
identities, and the new meanings infused into old terms.” 
Metcalf claimed to have been cued to the new direction by 
Benedict Anderson’s ‘paradox of nationalism’, namely, “that 
nation-states, a product of recent centuries, must always claim 
to be very, very old.” 14  On the contrary, the nationalism 
behind the independence movements in the colonies was very, 
very new, being a reaction to Western nationalist colonial 
policy.  
Although the new trend in writing national histories is 
veering away from the timeless view of traditional forms and 
events, modern Western histories have yet to veer away from 
the gone-with-the-wind concept of change. The Western 
polarization of East and West seems to imply it. In Weber’s 
account of the passage from myth to science, religion was 
 
13 David Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 4th ed. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: 
Silkworm Books, 2008), 3. 
14 Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xvi–xvii. According to 
the authors, the three-stage schema, inspired by the nationalism of historians, 
went something like this. There was the great Hindu civilization of old; then 
came the Muslims and the old Hindu civilization rigidified; then came the 
British who brought enlightened progress through modern science. 




dropped like an old shirt. The Protestant Ethic did not 
evolve, but emerged, as from an eclipse. The same either-or 
concept of change seems to be behind John A. T. Robinson’s 
Honest to God, which took its cue from Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s 
suggestion of speaking of God in the secular terms of the 
modern secular mind—not that they had no reason to think 
so. But Weber, as sociologist, and Robinson and Bonhoeffer, 
as theologians, were thinking as Europeans of Europe of only 
a portion of Europe. Bonhoeffer had especially in mind a 
particular European experiment in nationalism: Nazism. They 
were not speaking for the world at large, 15  although 
apparently in their thinking, the European experience was 
paradigmatic: what was good (bad) for Europe was good 
(bad) for the world. Even Hilaire Belloc, a Catholic, ventured 
to say: “Europe is the Faith, and the Faith is Europe.” Or as 
an American president of a management school once said to 
me: “There is no Asian management; there is only 
management in Asia.” 
One of the most respected Catholic theologians of the 
twentieth century, Karl Rahner, gave an address in 1979 at 
 
15 Marlé cautioned: “In describing Bonhoeffer . . . as a ‘man of disturbing 
vision’, I want to suggest that some of the traits of thought he sketches could 
easily lead to disastrous consequences. Some rash people have made him their 
authority for putting forward an attack on traditional Christianity which 
practically amounts to destroying it altogether. He himself . . . was aware of the 
dangers inherent in a study of obviously incomplete and one-sided reflexions 
of this kind, developed solely from a critical point of view. But I use the term 
‘disturbing’ in a positive sense as well.” See René Marlé, Bonhoeffer: The Man and 
His Works, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Newman Press, 1968), 107.  




the Weston School of Theology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
on the occasion of being awarded the honorary degree of 
Doctor of Humane Letters.16 The subject was the theological 
significance of Vatican II (1962–1965). Rahner believed that 
it was “meaningful and justified to consider Vatican II as the 
first major official event in which the Church actualized itself 
precisely as a world Church.” The flip side of actualizing a 
world Church was de-Europeanizing the Church. He 
compared the missionary activity of the Church prior to 
Vatican II to that of an export firm. Christian Europe 
exported Christianity in the same manner that the British 
exported the railway system to India: a product made in 
Europe.  
De-Europeanization was not rejection of European 
civilization and culture, but only of its “colossal one-
sidedness.”17 The issue was, of course, anything but simple 
and clear. Wrote Rahner: 
Admittedly, such questions about the de-
Europeanizing of the Church raise theoretical 
problems which are anything but clear. Must the 
marital morality of the Masais in East Africa 
 
16  Karl Rahner, “Towards a Fundamental Theological Interpretation of 
Vatican II,” Theological Studies 40, no. 4 (December 1979): 716–727. The 
address probably serves to fix the exact moment when some European 
theologians began to take a more reserved attitude towards Rahner’s theology.  
17 Paul Deussen as cited by J. L. Mehta, “Heidegger and Vedanta. Reflections 
on a Questionable Theme,” in Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 25. 




simply reproduce the morality of Western 
Christianity, or could a chieftain there, even if he 
is a Christian, live in the style of the patriarch 
Abraham? Must the Eucharist even in Alaska be 
celebrated with grape wine? Theoretical questions 
like these imply, more often than not, theoretical 
hindrances to the actualization of the world 
Church as such. Along with many other reasons, 
they help us to understand that the full official 
actualization of the world Church began to appear 
at Vatican II in a relatively initial and diffident 
way. At Mass before the individual sessions, when 
the different rites of the Church were presented, 
one still could not see any African dances.18 
Needless to say, Vatican II, as “the Church’s first official 
self-actualization (Selbstvollzug) as a world Church,” is still in 
the process of realization. The moves after Vatican II to 
increase the number of non-Europeans in the College of 
Cardinals; to ordain more non-European bishops and 
canonize more non-European saints; the translation of the 
Latin Mass into the vernacular; the introduction of 
indigenous music in liturgical celebrations; the relaxation of 
rules on clerical attire; the emergence of militant movements 
such as ‘liberation theology’ in South America and the 
formation of Christian comunidades de base (basic Christian  
 
18 Karl Rahner, “Towards a Fundamental Theological Interpretations,” 718. 




communities) all over the world; the idea that the Pope, the 
Bishop of Rome, could actually be an Asian or African or 
American; etc.—all of that has been part of the actualization 
of a world Church initiated by Vatican II.  
Asian Research and the University 
Our intention here is not to discuss the theological 
implications of Westernization, but to show that it is not an 
academic issue, even from the religious standpoint, and that it 
is an interdisciplinary issue in the academe. The 
Europeanization we denounce is the kind that reduces non-
European civilizations to a residual category of the European: 
not European. We do not denounce science; we denounce 
the reduction of science to natural science at the expense of 
human science. The reason (apart from colonial history) why 
our schools have virtually become mere conduits of Western 
civilization is the fact that our school system has come from 
the West. But a more practical reason is that much of the 
funding for research came from Western sponsors. Funds for 
research in natural science and technology do not create the 
Problematik here contemplated, for ‘fire burns here and in 
Persia’. The IRRI (International Rice Research Institute) at 
Los Baños continues to produce important technical results. 
It is research funding in the human sciences that typically has 
foreign strings attached.  
That our Philippine schools have become a conduit of 
Western culture is especially evident in the social sciences. 




With exceptions, of course, the underlying theme in social 
theory is still Weber’s dichotomy between the modern 
impersonal bureaucracy and the traditional kinship system, 
which itself is merely an application of the more general 
theme of Weber: “Only we, judging from the standpoint of 
our modern views of nature, can distinguish objectively”: 
what is correct and what is fallacious, what is rational and 
what is irrational, what is science and what is myth, what is 
technology and what is magic.19  
Independent research would discover that the impersonal 
and objective organization, and its meritocratic system of 
rewards and punishments, are not viable institutions even in 
the West. Weber’s rational society is an ideal type that does 
not exist and never existed. Precisely because it does not take 
the person, but only the performance into account—
meritocracy has been rejected as an unjust system of rewards 
and punishments. This we have come to learn not from logic, 
but from experience, or from history. Social legislation (now 
covered under the term corporate governance) has put limits 
on both bureaucracy and meritocracy through regulation. 
Social legislation on the minimum wage, on working hours, 
on the hiring of women and children, on the right to 
 
19 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans. Ephraim Fischoff, Introduction 
by Talcott Parsons (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 2: “Only we, judging from 
the standpoint of our modern views of nature, can distinguish objectively in 
such behavior those attributes of causality which are ‘correct’ from those 
which are ‘fallacious’, and designate the fallacious attributions of causality as 
irrational, and the corresponding acts as ‘magic’.” 




association, on trade unions, on social security, on health care, 
etc., is not about the work, but about the worker, the person 
and his/her rights, and the fundamental rights defended and 
celebrated in the Declaration of Independence of the 
American colonies, and even in the Magna Carta, if made to 
refer also to the commoner and not mainly to the noble men 
of England. 
Independent research in the human sciences discovers that 
the Western dichotomies have been proven wrong and 
unviable by historical experience. The legislation against the 
employment of women and children, for instance, 
presupposes a level of political and economic development 
and cannot be understood absolutely or in the abstract. For in 
poor countries or poor areas of a country, the legislation may 
not make sense at all. In poor countries, the state is too poor 
to carry out adequate social service, unless the women and 
the children worked, they would starve. In such places and 
circumstances, children go to work, rather than to school. 
The result might be the ludicrous spectacle of policemen 
chasing and beating children for trying to earn a living 
because it is against the law. Nor is it always a case of 
irresponsible parents, for the adults themselves may be 
victims of the situation. Even in advanced economies, in 
times of recession, people want to work, but cannot find 
work. Unfortunately, it is the norm in poor countries, which 
lack the basic infrastructure for economic and social 
adequacy.  




There is room for Oriental (African and Asian) research—
one that does not reject Western research, but only its 
‘colossal one-sidedness’. By Oriental research, then, we do 
not mean research in the Orient or by Orientals. We mean 
research on the Oriental way of being and doing ‘in and for 
itself’ rather than in comparison with the West. Is there such 
a beast? The West claims there is a Western way and, more 
importantly, that the Western way is opposed to the Oriental 
way. They said it; we are merely taking it from there.  
If something can be done about the situation, it is our 
universities and graduate schools that must take the initiative. 
The high school graduate is helpless against bully scholarship. 
Higher education is the proper center for Asian research, one 
that will not assume that the West has the exclusive franchise 
on reason and efficiency, and can meet theory with theory. 
We cannot overemphasize that if Western and Eastern 
research are not dichotomous, still they are different, even 
historically. In order for our leaders and governors to be able 
to successfully manage the difference, Asian research must 
reveal why and how they are different rather than 
dichotomous, why and how they must combine, if only so 
that our institutions may become more effective and more 
just.  
The school is the institution formally charged to pass on 
the accumulated results of research to the next generation. 
We do not look down on the conduit-school; it is the normal 
school. But besides the conduit-school, a country must have 




source-schools, unless it is content to tap the research of 
others, which may be different, which may not fit our 
historical situation. Thus, a conduit-school, in the sense we 
take it, is not merely a school that does little or no research of 
its own. An ‘Asian’ school that does a lot of research, but 
uses ‘other’ premises, is still a conduit-school in the sense 
taken here. Nor are the data sought only science data, the 
results of scientific research, for that would be scientism. In 
deed and in fact, the data which science and philosophy (and 
theology) build on are ultimately commonsense data, and 
what keeps science and philosophy (and theology) from flying 
wild into the blue yonder is common sense. 
Asian research in the sense taken here makes little sense in 
the natural sciences, for fire burns here and everywhere else 
in this world. But Asian research in the human sciences 
makes good sense. In the meantime, we have come to 
understand more clearly the difference between science and 
philosophy, and we have learned to distinguish between 
natural and human science. We differentiate in order to 
integrate. We argue that the Western propensity to the 
dichotomy is its concept of a unitary science, in which the 
objective method of natural science as an action theory 
replaces the subjective method of human science as an actor-
action theory. 
Our concept of change is Musashi, rather than Gone With 
the Wind. The difference in the colonization of North and 
South America may help clarify the transformative change we 




have in mind. The colonization of North America (the 
United States and Canada) did not require transformative 
change in the population, for the colonizers from the Old 
World merely replaced the natives of the New World.20 By 
contrast, in South America as in Asia and Africa, such 
exclusion was not feasible given the size alone of the native 
population. This difference in colonial history adequately 
explains how North America was able to industrialize rapidly, 
while South America, Asia, and Africa have taken and are 
taking a longer time. Japan was able to modernize swiftly so 
that by 1905 its navy beat the Russian navy. Japan 
modernized quickly by copying Western technology, not 
Western culture. Japan’s achievement might have given Lenin 
the idea that Communism should adopt American Scientific 
Management separated from its capitalist ideology. 
Communist China finally tried it and has become the second 
largest economy in the world after the first, the United States 
of America. Japan is third. 
The Afro-Asian scholar must not hesitate, but must make 
it a point to refer to Oriental traditions and its sages. Modern 
scholars seem embarrassed and apologetic for seeking 
corroboration from philosophers of antiquity and—heaven 
forbid—from Oriental sages. In typical modern scholarly 
studies, referring to antiquity for support is antiquarian; to  
 
 
20  The same may be said of Australia and New Zealand (and modern 
Israel?). 




Oriental wisdom, byzantine. But if there is West, there must 
be East, unless, of course, western is claimed to mean the 
same as universal. Fewer and fewer scholars today would 
make such a claim.  
If then we want to know who we are, then we must do 
independent research. If we want to modernize more rapidly, 
then let us copy superior technology, but keep the faith—in 
our traditions, in ourselves: sa ating pinanggalingan. 
 
